



**COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
CENTER OF EXCELLENCE**

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28240 – HOYO DE MANZANARES
MADRID (SPAIN)



C-IED COE/PtF 2012/08

SUBJECT: Final report from the Counter IED Lessons Learned Workshop,
Spain, Hoyo de Manzanares, 29th Nov till 01st Dec 2011

DATE: 20 March 2012

1. Introduction

The Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED COE) organised, in cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA), their first C-IED COE Lessons Learned workshop. The workshop was open for NATO Commands, NATO Contributing Nations, Partnership for Peace, ISAF Contributing Nations and EDA.

The workshop was held from the 29th Nov 2011 till 01st Dec 2011 at the C-IED COE, Hoyo de Manzanares, Spain.

The overarching topic of the workshop was: Lessons Learned within Counter - IED.

2. Aim

The aim of this Lessons Learned workshop was:

- To conduct open discussions on the presented subjects;
- To get the attendees (nations and organizations) acquainted with the Centre of Excellence and their capabilities;
- And to provide an opportunity to network.

3. Main themes

The main themes for this workshop were issues and challenges within the field of Counter IED. After coordination with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and with the European Defence Agency the following three topics were chosen for the workshop:

- I. Lesson Learned in developing Attack the Networks;
- II. Pre-deployment training versus in theatre training;
- III. Information exchange out of theatre.

4. Structure

Introduced by four briefings each of the above listed main themes was discussed for one day. These briefings were provided by different agencies and gave a different perspective on each main theme. The briefings followed a short Question and Answer (Q&A) period. Afterwards the audience / attendees were divided in four syndicates. Each syndicate discussed a sub-theme on the main topic. The syndicates were requested to provide a short presentation during the plenary meeting on the findings and possible solutions. The detailed programme for the workshop is attached (Annex A).

5. Overall findings

During the workshop several lessons were identified. They can be found together with a discussion on the rationale, with recommendations and current statuses within the Alliance (Annex C).

Regardless the fact, that the three different main themes listed above were discussed, one subject dominated the findings of all syndicates: C-IED information management within NATO.

5.1. Information Exchange


There is a general lack of communications and information exchange between nations, within NATO and outside NATO and with other organisations (military, non-military and/or interagency). It is not the will of all actors, but national caveats, security issues, different (and not interacting) computer networks and political agenda's are hampering the information sharing processes.

5.2. Information overflow

There is a overflow of classified and unclassified C-IED information available on different environments (e.g. BICES, ACT Transnet, JALLC Database, ISAF/IJC WISE page, CIMICWEB ...). In numerous cases the information are not structured, not updated, not prioritised and not validated. Essential information are often not obvious.

5.3. Discussion

The C-IED COE with his close national ties to intelligence and law enforcement organisations and as a NATO accredited organisation with multinational status should take a mediator role in the development of a C-IED information exchange process. Thus the nations and NATO should accept the COE as a full partner for information gathering, handling and providing.



5.4. Way ahead

The C-IED COE has initiated the process to establish a C-IED information exchange system including the exchange of Lessons Learned. The establishment of a classified and unclassified C-IED information portal supported by nations and NATO staff with wide access should be pursued to the quickest and widest extent. The information portal will include a repository of contact information (“who is who in C-IED”).

Another topic of general interest was the discussion on information gathering, processing, sharing and distribution of C-IED information post Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the main area where C-IED data are gathered and there were concerns that all C-IED information available will be possibly lost, when NATO will reduce its presence and finally leave the country. Instead of developing new processes and investing in new structures, participants felt, nations should invest in an overall organisation conducting information collection, assessment and dissemination. The C-IED COE could play a major role in that regard and nations should consider enhancing their contribution to the COE.

6. Further workshops

The workshop was considered to be of great value. It was recommended to conduct further Lessons Learned workshops on a regular basis. In what time frame should be determined with the different organisations.

In 2012, the C-IED COE will conduct a workshop, which will be accessible for interagency and law enforcement organisations.

7. Further developments

The C-IED COE is working on different projects. According to the NATO's C-IED Action Plan, the COE has been assigned as the Content Manager for the NATO's C-IED Information Portal and will be the NATO C-IED Lessons Learned Coordinator. Its status as a multinational organisation with its embedded interagency relationships provides far-ranging opportunities to improve existing strategies in the fight against the C-IED threat. The COE is accessible not only to military, but to other interagency organisations. The C-IED COE is a young and dynamic organisation. It needs to develop itself further. This development can only be done with the assistance and acceptance of organisations and nations in the role the C-IED COE could and should take.



Santiago San Antonio Demetrio
Colonel, ESP Army
C-IED COE Director

List of annexes

- A. Workshop program
- B. Workshop themes
- C. Lessons identified
- D. List of participants

ANNEX A – Workshop program

C-IED COE Lessons Learned Workshop - Agenda			
NAME OF EVENT : C-IED COE Lessons Learned Workshop 29 th Nov - 01 th Dec 2011			
Tuesday 29 th of November 2011			
Time		Activity / Agenda item	Remarks
08.00		Depart from hotel	
08.30	08.45	In processing	
08.45	09.15	Welcome address	
09.15	09.30	Introduction	Group picture
09.30	13.30	Session I (part 1)	Lesson Learned in developing Attack the Networks
09.30	11.30	Presentations	
11.30	12.00	Break	
12.00	13.30	Discussion round	
13.30	15.00	Lunch	
15.00	16.00	Session I (part 2)	Lesson Learned in developing Attack the Networks
15.00	16.00	Plenary briefing	Including questions & wrap up
16.00		Depart to hotel	
17.30	19.30	Social event	

Wednesday 30 th of November 2011			
Time		Activity / Agenda item	Remarks
08.00		Depart from hotel	
08.30	16.00	Session II	Pre-deployment training versus in theatre training
08.30	10.30	Presentations	
10.30	11.00	Break	
11.00	13.30	Discussion round	
13.30	15.00	Lunch	
15.00	16.00	Plenary briefing	Including questions & wrap up
16.00	16.30	C-IED COE	Introduction to the C-IED COE
16.30		Depart to hotel	

Thursday 1 st of December 2011			
Time		Activity / Agenda item	Remarks
07.30		Depart from hotel	
07.30	13.30	Session III	Information exchange out of theatre
08.00	10.00	Presentations	
10.00	10.15	Break	
10.15	12.30	Discussion round	
12.30	13.30	Plenary briefing	Including questions & wrap up
13.30	14.30	Lunch	
14.30		Departure of delegates	

ANNEX B – Workshop themes

Theme: Lesson Learned in developing Attack the Networks

The fight against the IED system is faced with new threats. To be more efficient requires a shift from a defensive to an offensive “mindset” to Attack the Networks (AtN) – we must adapt. What are the new challenges and how can we become more efficient? What is the best approach for an AtN concept (offensive, reactive, defensive)? What are the key C-IED Activities for which we should capture lessons learned and how (e.g. Exploitation, Biometrics, Search, Network Analysis, Vulnerabilities, Influence Activities, Targeting). Taking into account legal limitations, how we can make best use of biometric data? Do we need a biometric LL procedure data base? What is the right balance between attacking the Centres of Gravity of Networks and individual targeting? How do we identify relevant information during the information sharing process?

Presenter	Topic
LCol (Army) Jose Antonio Cruz Moro - C-IED COE	KNOWN-UNKNOWNs in AtN
Jennifer Davenport - Badger Team - Badger Attack the Network lead	Attack the Network Enabled Through Exploitation
Lt (Army) Leila Ketterlinus - TF Paladin	CITP Mota Khan IED Case Study
Marisol Nieves - JIEDDO / JET	Human Network Analysis Lessons Learned - A Training Perspective

Syndicate sub-theme on the main topic

Syndicate	Sub topic on main theme
I	What is the best approach for an AtN concept (offensive, reactive, defensive)?
II	What are the new challenges and how can we become more efficient?
III	How do we identify relevant information during the information sharing process?
IV	How LEGAD can support AtN and targeting activities.

Theme: Pre-deployment training versus in theatre training

Training is fundamental for preparing the forces. Nations are to meet the minimum training requirements outlined in STANAG 2294. During operational deployments a wide disparity in the preparedness of the nations has been identified / documented – some still deploy not well prepared. One of the possibilities is to conduct in theatre training. Some nations do it, some not. But is in theatre training the answer? Is this a threat? How should LL on pre-deployment training issues be captured from in-theatre and out of theatre perspectives and disseminated to nations out of theatre for maximum benefit during their training cycle? What process can be used to ensure C-IED lessons learned are used to improve training and Mission Rehearsal Exercise Planning and Execution?

Presenter	Topic
David Foldy - JFC Brunssum	NATO and ISAF Training
Oscar Fernandez - Badger Team Attack the Network Lead	Pre-deployment Training vs. In Theatre Training
LCol (Army) James Garven - C-IED Lessons Exploitation Centre LWDG SO1	LWDG LXC - Mission Specific Training (MST) and RSOI
Vern Tubbs - JIEDDO / JET	JOINT EXPEDITIONARY TEAM

Syndicate sub-theme on the main topic

Syndicate	Sub topic on main theme
I	Why and how can we benefit from in theatre training? Is in theatre training a risk for operational deployments?
II	How should LL issues be captured from in-theatre and out of theatre perspectives and disseminated to nations for maximum benefit during their training cycles?
III	What process can be used to ensure C-IED lessons learned are used to improve training, planning and execution for Mission Rehearsal Exercises?
IV	How to institutionalize AtN training at the tactical level?

Theme: Information exchange out of theatre

During a mission period a lot of data is collected and processed. But how can we benefit from that? It is assessed that the out of theatre info exchange requires improvement. How can we increase the total sharing of knowledge (Lessons Learned) to all participants and/or organizations involved? Should Mobile Lessons Learned Training Teams be deployed to nations to push and ensure understanding of the most important lessons learned at unit level? To what extent should LL topics be included in courses and Senior Leader Engagements?

Presenter	Topic
Maj (Army) van Bekkum - C-IED COE	Information Exchange
LCol (Army) James Garven - C-IED Lessons Exploitation Centre LWDG SO1	LWDG LXC - Learning Lessons During The Operations
Capt (Navy) Jeffrey Juhala - HQ Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT)	ACT C-IED Integrated Product Team
Owen Murphy - JIEDDO / JET	Joint IED Defeat Organization - Lessons Learned Program

An extra presentation was done by

Presenter	Topic
John Caldwell - NATO Civil Military Fusion Centre	Counter-IED Information Sharing for the Civil-Military Community

Syndicate sub-theme on the main topic

Syndicate	Sub topic on main theme
I	How can we increase knowledge sharing (LI/LL) to all levels?
II	Should Mobile LL Teams be deployed to nations to support and encourage understanding of the most important LL at all levels?
III	What information is there to share and what do we really need?
IV	Current methods of sharing

ANNEX C – Lessons Identified during the workshop.

1. Lessons Identified.

The best approach for an AtN concept should be a mix of offensive, reactive and defensive measure.

Discussion

It is wise to balance the three approaches (offensive, reactive, defensive) for an AtN concept, which needs to consider Counter Insurgency aspects. An initial step would be to develop a common language and common training standards. Furthermore the information exchange and sharing processes about resources and expertise as well as about actionable intelligence requires further improvement. E.g. not all nations have the same AtN capabilities like ISR, targeting, intelligence fusion and training.

Recommendation

- a. Continue to create a universal approach to the AtN pillar of the C-IED strategy, also considering Counter Insurgency aspects and including common language and common training standards.
- b. Investigate possibilities to share and / or combine AtN-capabilities among nations and NATO organisations (as part of SMART Defence initiative?)

Current status

- a. There is currently no formal and common agreed NATO AtN publication available. There are several national publications and a draft NATO AtN Handbook available, but none of them are describing a common agreed NATO AtN concept. A future NATO AtN concept, which needs to reflect offensive, reactive and defensive approaches and to harmonise C-IED and Counter Insurgency operations, needs to be developed as soon as possible. ACT intends to release a "NATO AtN Handbook", which will provide the basis for further discussion, a common agreed concept and finally a NATO agreed AtN publication. The NSA C-IED Working Group is waiting for ACT to release that Handbook for the Group expressed the intention at their 6th meeting (Oct. 2011) to put this forward as a standardisation proposal. ACT leads the development on a Campaign Plan for C-IED in NATO. This Campaign Plan addresses this issue as well.
- b. It could be given to the C-IED Task Force to consider using this recommendation for a SMART defence initiative

2. Lessons Identified.

C-IED is not solely a military subject, it becomes more and more a problem with an interagency and multinational dimension. This provides (new) challenges and requires other and may be new ways to increase our effectiveness and efficiency.

Discussion

IED's are affecting not only military forces and the local population. In addition, operations of organisations providing e.g. relief to the native population are affected by the IED threat. Furthermore, military organisations have not the means to cover all dimensions of countering the IED threat. Thus, it is obvious that the IED threat is not solely a military problem. Both, the relationships to governmental and non-governmental organisation as well as the relationships to intelligence and law enforcement organisations need to be improved. That can only be done when all organisation concerned are willing to share their information and expertise among each other. To optimise the sharing of information and expertise, multinational/Interagency interoperability and the establishment of frameworks are needed. In many countries this will require a review of legal limitation regarding the options of military and non-military cooperation.

Recommendation

Institutionalisation of interagency relationships and integration of all dimensions of C-IED in a common approach. A high emphasis must lay on AtN measure.

Current status

There are several initiatives and projects ongoing on different levels and pursued by different entities, which are aiming for further improvements of the cooperation of military and non-military organisations. E.g. the NATO Terrorism Task Force and the NATO Defence Policy and Planning Committee are working on mitigating common shortfalls regarding NATO and EU activities. During ISAF operations some nations have institutionalised e.g. the cooperation of military, intelligence and law enforcement organisations. The C-IED COE is establishing contacts to different national and international law enforcement and intelligence organisation and will conduct an Interagency Workshop in November 2012.

3. Lessons Identified.

There is an overflow of C-IED related information in both operational and civilian environments. The problem to identify relevant information is increasing. A lot of information is over classified.

Discussion

The number of information regarding IED's is tremendous. Information is available on open sources; Information is available on classified sources. However, a lot of sources are either not known or are limited in access to the person or organisation needing the information. The availability of this information is hindered by national caveats, security issues and different information sharing systems / databases. Information is also over classified, not structured, not updated, not prioritised and not validated, their relevance is not obvious. There is no single C-IED information portal units/organisations/nations can use as a single source for information covering all C-IED related operational aspects. There is no process institutionalised providing some kind of quality assurance for the information posted on the different environments.

Recommendation

- a. Reporting processes in operations and in NATO must be standardised. This applies for a standardised information sharing system with an appropriate information management process (collection, analyse, fuse, assess, exploit, archive and disseminate of C-IED information).
- b. The owner of information must carefully consider the classification of his information.
- c. Establish a C-IED Informational Portal (a "one-stop shop") for unclassified and classified information including a content, information and quality management process.
- d. Produce and regularly distributed C-IED information (e.g. monthly/quarterly newsletter) including "best practices", LI/LL, TTP's, etc.

Current status

- a. There is a missing link between the existing EOD reporting system of AEODP 6 and NATO C-IED doctrine. ISAF has released SOP 10373 which covers the operational reporting requirements in theatre. STANAG 2298 (WIT) is still under revision. But a common C-IED reporting system covering all needs is not in place and there are no initiatives know to create this. Detailed requirements and possible further measure thru e.g. the NATO C-IED WG, the NATO C-IED Conference and the NATO C-IED TF should be considered.
- b. The current national classification processes including the use of automated reporting systems needs to be reconsidered by all nations. All levels down to tactical level need to be aware how classifications are preventing appropriate information sharing.
- c. The C-IED Task Force has this as an action item (CC1). The C-IED COE is also looking at the unclassified solution to expand from a training focus into unclassified sharing. In February 2012 the C-IED COE has developed a concept for a multiple classification layer C-IED Information Portal including a limited content, information and quality assurance process. Initial coordination talks with the BICES Agency, IMS and ACT have taken place beginning of March. Aim is, to revise existing NATO C-IED information platforms and harmonise them to facilitate the use by all users. It is envisaged that an updated version of the Portal on BICES can be published mid 2012. For the unclassified version coordination with ACT is ongoing and should be expected to be updated mid 2012.
- d. The development of regularly distributed C-IED information is under consideration of the C-IED COE. The dissemination of best practices/LI/LL information is part of the C-IED Information Portal concept.

4. Lessons Identified.

(NATO) Forces are bound to their national caveats. This can conflict with the host nation laws during the AtN and targeting activities. Appropriate LEGAD support must be available to support C-IED AtN and targeting activities.

Discussion

The whole prosecution process (search, evidence collection, confiscating, detention, interrogation, imprisoning, conviction ...) of any suspect involved in IED activities has huge legal implications. Military requirements and operations are often not harmonised with the laws of the country own forces are operating in. Legal advisors needs to be involved from earliest moment to assure, that both operational imperatives and laws of a local/host nations are harmonised to assure that the prosecution process is not hampered or can fail due to the demands of local laws.

Recommendation

Ensure LEGAD support at any stage of C-IED prosecution processes to consider local/host nation laws and regulations rather than adhering to ISAF/NATO/national specific regulations/laws only.

5. Lessons Identified.

Nations and NATO are conducting in-theatre training to build up in-theatre required skills (e.g. Weapon Intelligence Team training).

Discussion

Pre-deployment training is the basis to prepare forces. They should be deployed into theatre, as a minimum, according to the training requirements derived from the Combined Joint State of Requirements (CJSOR) and the governing STANAG's. In-theatre training should only be done to familiarise staffs/ troops with the local environment, provide "last minute" updates on local tactical situations/enemy TTP's/threats, as a refresher course or to train on new equipment/material. In-theatre training should not be considered as a replacement or substitute training to pre-deployment training. Every day a soldier is conducting in-theatre training he is not available for operations.

Recommendation

Units must be deployed fully trained. In-theatre training should be limited to train rotating personnel, familiarisation with the local tactical environment and "last minute" in-theatre changes.

Current status

The in-theatre WIT training has been cancelled effective 31 March 2012. In 2012 nations have the option to participate at WIT courses at the C-IED COE in Spain and Hungary. In 2013 the C-IED COE intends to continue providing WIT courses.

6. Lessons Identified.

In theatre LI/LL should be captured by specialists.

Discussion

There are differences to capture LI/LL in theatre amongst nations. Some nations have embedded LI/LL collectors in their deployed units; some nations have established a process, where units are sending their observations back home; some nations have established an interrogation process post deployment.

LI/LL should be collected by both, the units on the ground and specialists. No doubt, the operational level soldier is a very important and valuable source for observations and LI's, but the collection process is very administrative and time consuming process. Thus main emphasis should be on a process in theatre conducted by dedicated LI/LL specialist who are deploying with or visiting the units and interviewing the troops. This will assure, that the observations will be handled and processed in a professional way and can be implemented on the different levels affected with higher efficiency and better effects. Finally, the value of the LI/LL process will be higher.

Recommendation

During missions deploy LI/LL specialist with the units.

Current status

Apart from the efforts JALLC provides only some nations are deploying LI/LL specialist with their units.

7. Lessons Identified.

LI/LL needs to be processed according to national accepted and standardised methods using a common agreed terminology.

Discussion

LI/LL can be valuable information for units, organisations and nations, therefore they need to be shared amongst those. Information sharing requires standardised processes and procedures. E.g. in ISAF reporting procedures are not in line with NATO doctrine (e.g. AAP 6 vs 10-liner). Regardless the terminologies stated in AAP 6, even EOD/IEDD specialist are using different and sometimes not common agreed terms and acronyms.

Recommendation

- a. After capturing LI/LL, information should be processed according to NATO LL process.
- b. Standardise C-IED terminology.

Current status

- a. See below para 8 (current status)
- b. Terminology review is a constant process of all Working Groups of the NSA.

8. Lessons Identified.

Currently there is no synchronised C-IED focused NATO/multinational LI/LL capability. There is no NATO process established to ensure, that C-IED LL are used to improve Mission Rehearsal Exercises. JALLC has developed the NATO LL process, controls the LL data base including a C-IED folder. The C-IED information there are partially not sorted and outdated. JALLC has no the specific C-IED expertise

Discussion

LI/LL are important and valuable information for units, organisations and nations. They need to be gathered and handled (managed, analysed and shared) in a formal and professional way. This should be done by processes and an organisation with appropriate expertise, which is visible, accessible and trusted. All LI/LL should be stored on a central C-IED LI/LL data base. Of great concern is who will take this role after termination of the operations in Afghanistan.

The C-IED COE with his role as a NATO and multinational organisation could play a major role as the collector and disseminator of C-IED LI/LL.

Recommendation

- a. The C-IED COE should become the NATO C-IED LI/LL coordinator.
- b. The C-IED COE should consider developing a mobile capability to deploy to operations, other COE's and national LL institutions for LI/LL collection. The focus of such a team should lay on subjects with impact on multinational interoperability with the aim to improve NATO Mission Rehearsal Exercises.
- c. Create a central C-IED LI/LL data base, which should be controlled by C-IED specialists.

Current status

- a. According to the NATO C-IED Action Plan the C-IED COE has been assigned to act as the NATO C-IED LI/LL coordinator. A concept, how to fulfil this task has been developed by the C-IED COE in conjunction with the concept for the C-IED Informational Portal. Further details are described above (LI number 3, current status, subpar c.)
- b. The current manning of the C-IED COE does not consider the provision of a mobile LI/LL collection capability.
- c. The C-IED COE intends to forward this further discussion to the NATO C-IED TF and the C-IED WG.

9. Lessons Identified.

There is a knowledge deficiency on basic C-IED skills and Attack the Network principles both on tactical and on operational level.

Discussion

Preparing the force is a national responsibility. Due to different national constraints, legal limitations and interpretations AtN training is not standardised. Some entities are considering C-IED operations as an engineer or EOD task and not being an "all arms" approach. The deficiency is visible on all command levels as well as on tactical unit/individual level.

Recommendation

- a. Nations should send more personnel to the Attack the Network Analysis and C-IED Staff Officer Awareness courses. Not only junior officers or engineers or EOD personnel should attend. More emphasis must lay on J2, J3, J5 and J7 officers up to OF-4 level.
- b. Establish a 1-2 day Senior Leadership C-IED awareness course for OF-5 and above.
- c. Additions for tactical level pre-deployment training are:
 - i. Search skills;
 - ii. Ground sign awareness
 - iii. Detector training
 - iv. Tactical unit organisation should include additional skills like e.g. UAV and EW operators and dedicated intelligence specialists.
 - v. Nations conduct more Train the Trainers Training (T3).

Current status

- a. At the moment the C-IED COE is offering a 1-day Senior Leadership C-IED Awareness course on request. Nations and NATO HQ's are encouraged to send appropriate requests to the C-IED COE.

ANNEX D – List of participants

A total of 70 persons attended the C-IED COE workshop.

Country	Attendees no	Country	Attendees no
Austria	1	Ireland	1
Belgium	3	Italy	4
Bulgaria	2	Netherlands	4
Canada	3	Poland	2
Czech Republic	2	Portugal	1
Denmark	1	Slovakia	2
Finland	1	Spain	12
France	3	Sweden	2
Germany	4	United States	17
Great Britain	5		

Organization (not all are listed)	Country
EDA	
NATO - ACT	
NATO - ACO	
NATO - JALLC	
NATO - HQ NATO Rapid Deployment Corps - Turkey	
NATO - Civil Military Fusion Centre	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operations & Training - Doctrine and Requirements Division • G2 Belgium Land forces 	Belgium
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land Forces Staff • Joint Force Command 	Bulgaria

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/PfP/EU

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY LESSONS LEARNED CENTRE 	Canada
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JOINT CBRN DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE 	Czech Republic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Service C-IED Branch, Army Operational Command 	Denmark
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense Command Finland Operations Division 	Finland
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIED expert French Land Components Forces Command HQ • Joint Explosive Ordnance Warfare Centre 	France
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GE MOD, JOINT OPERATION STAFF • German EOD-Center 	Germany
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lessons Exploitation Centre • UK Integration/Weapons Technical Intelligence Office 	Great Britain
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORDENANCE SCHOOL 	Ireland
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Italian Counter IED COE / Joint • Italian Joint Operation Headquarters 	Italy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JTF C-IED • Combat Training School, Instruction Group C-IED 	Netherlands
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Engineering Directorate MOD • Military Engineering and CBRN Centre 	Poland
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENGINEERING SCHOOL ARMY 	Portugal
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General Staff of the Slovak Army • EOD COE 	Slovakia

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/PfP/EU

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION • Spanish Land Forces HQ • Academia de Ingenieros 	Spain
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Force Command J2 • 1. INSATSKOMP, HKPFLJ 	Sweden
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JIEDDO (COIC, JCOE, JET) • JMTC BADGER TEAM HOHENFELS • CJTF PALADIN / 71st Ordnance Group (EOD) • HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (HQDA G-3/5/7) 	United States

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/PfP/EU

Attendees

NATION	SURNAME	NAME	NATO/RANK	UNIT	CONTACT
AUT	HANDLE	Paul	OF-4 / LTC	JALLC	phandle@jallc.nato.int
BEL	CHRISTIAENS	Jurgen	OF-3 / MAJOR	Operations & Training - Doctrine and Requirements Division	jurgen.christiaens@mil.be
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BEL	ROELAND	Geert	OR-8 / WOII	Operational Command - Section 2	geert.roeland@mil.be
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DEU	CARPENTIER	Hans-Georg	OF-4 / LTC	Joint Support Command	hansgeorgcarpentier@bundeswehr.org
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